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THE STOCKLEY VERDICT: AN EXPLAINER
Chad Flanders*
The purpose o f this document is to help explain some o f the existing
Missouri law that Judge Wilson used in his opinion. It does not take a side
on the opinion itself. At the end o f the day, the decision Judge Wilson made
was based on his call on various disputed factual questions. The law was
not, for the most part, at issue. I attempt only to describe the legal
framework within with Judge Wilson decided the case; not to support or to
criticize his verdict. Each person will ultimately have to make his or her
own judgment about whether the decision was correct.
Page numbers refer to the opinion, available here.
p. 18) The standard of proof in a trial is "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." This is the same in a bench trial as in a jury trial. The state has the
burden of proof as to each element of the crime.
p. 18) There are three elements to first degree murder: the person must
have 1) knowingly, 2) caused the death of another person, and 3) after
deliberation upon the matter. 1 "Knowing," as it relates to a result means
that you are aware of the "practical certainty" that your action will cause
that result. There is no dispute, here, that Stockley caused the death of
Anthony Lamar Smith, and did it aware that his actions were practically
certain to cause the result. One of the key questions in the case is whether
he did so with "deliberation." (The other key question was whether he
acted in self-defense).
p. 18) "Deliberation" is defined by statute as "cool reflection for any

• Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This document is my best
effort to explain the legal issues in the Stockley verdict. It was written quickly, so please
make allowances. Corrections will be made as necessary and the article will be updated
when possible. Feel free to send comments to chad.flanders(a lu.<!du Thanks to the staff
of the law journal for making the timely posting of this article possible.
Permission to reprint and distribute this article is hereby granted, provided citation is
made. Please cite as Chad Flanders, The Stockley Verdict: An Explainer, Saint Louis
University Law Review Online, September 15, 2017.
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length of time, no matter how brief." 2 Missouri court cases have found
deliberation to happen in a matter of seconds, or even the time it takes to
snap a finger, so it may be better interpreted to mean "they acted
deliberately" rather than that "they thought about it for a while." 3
p. 18) Mental states, like deliberation, are usually inferred from the
circumstances. We can't read people's minds. 4 But we can look at what
they do and say to figure out what they thought. 5
p. 19) The defendant has the burden of injecting self-defense into the
proceedings, 6 but the defendant has no burden to prove that he did act in
self-defense. This means there has to be some evidence of each element of
self-defense present in the evidence before the court (the elements of selfdefense are explained in more detail below), but the defense doesn't have
the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did act in selfdefense (who has this burden is explained in the next paragraph). As the
2

RSMO 565.002.

3

As the State notes, it appears that, in addition to claiming insufficient evidence of
deliberation, Terry is raising a claim that the State improperly represented to the jury the
time necessary to prove deliberation. During closing arguments, the prosecutor snopped his
fingers to demonstrate the time necessary for deliberation. Terry argues thot such a
representation is of an "instantaneous'" action. We disagree. 'The shortness of time for
deliberating and premeditoting killing is immoterial for purposes of proving murder in the
first degree." State v. Hudson, 154 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Mo.App.S.D.2005). Deliberotion only
requires o "brief moment of'cool reflection:" Cole, 71 S.W.3d at 169. In this case, Terry
had not only a brief moment but a matter of minutes to decide to abandon the attack. He
had multiple opportunities to abandon the robbery turned murder. He injured Schwartz,
knocking him to the ground and incopocitating him, before he chose to shoot him directly
in the head.
Stole v. Terry, 501 S.W.3d 456,460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
"'Direct proof thot a person acted 'knowingly' is o f ten unavoilable ,md is usually
infe1Ted from evidence of the circumstances surrounding the incident.'' State v. Browning.
357 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Mo.App. S.D.2012) (quoting State 1 . Fackrell, 277 S.W.3d 859.
863 64 (Mo.App. S.D.2009)).
4

°

State v. Hibler, 422 S.W.3d 407,409 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
5

However, because it [deliberation] is a state of mind, direct proof is seldom available
and the element must be infened from the circumstances.
State v. Bridges, 810 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
6

This is part of the self-defense statute. RSMO. 563.03 l.5.
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court notes, either side can show this evidence, but it is usually the defense
that does this, as it is in their interest in do so. Once the evidence is out
there, then--in a jury case--there will be a basis for the judge to instruct the
jury on the instruction. If it is a bench trial (only a judge), it will be up to
the judge to consider the defense.
p. 19) If there is some evidence supporting self-defense--enough so that
it goes to the trier of fact (the judge or the jury) to decide on it, then the
state gets a new burden. This is something in the law that is very helpful to
Stockley: it is as if the state has a new burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Stockley did not act in self-defense. 7 In a way, the introduction
of self-defense, adds a new element to the crime. Now, the state has to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stockley 1) knowingly, 2) caused the
death of another, 3) after deliberation and 4) he did not act in self-defense.
p. 19) Law enforcement officer's use of force. At the time, Missouri's
self-defense statute did not include a "stand your ground" provision. That
meant that if someone threatened force on you, and you could avoid using
force by running way, you had a duty to do so. This does not apply (and
never did apply) to law enforcement officers, per Missouri statute. They do
not have to run away in the face of a threat of force. 8 This exception is
explicitly noted in the self-defense statute. 9
p. 19) The verdict also mentions that law enforcement officers can use
force to effect the arrest of a person who is fleeing, who is trying to escape
by means of a deadly weapon, and the officer reasonably believes force is
necessary to make the arrest. 10 This may seem to apply in this case, but it
doesn't really. As the defense's written submission makes clear, Stockley
was arguing self-defense, not that he was using force in order to arrest
Smith. (This provision may, apply, however, to the shots Stockley fired at
7

RSMO 556.035 ("If the issue is submitted to the trier of fact any reasonable doubt on
the issue requires a finding for the defendant on that issue.")
8

"A law enforcement officer nee<l not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the a rrest,
or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person he or she reasonably
believes to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the
arrestee." RSMO. 563.046.
9

RSMO. 563.031.l(c) (law enforcement officer can permissibly be the "initial
aggressor").
10

Although the law enforcement officer use of force statute has changed recently, this
was always part ofit. See RSMO. 563.046.3.
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the car, or when the police vehicle rammed the vehicle Smith was driving.)
pp. 19-20) The statement by Stockley as evidence of deliberation.
Evidence of someone "planning" to kill someone is relevant to inferring
del.b
. "
1 erat10n.
p. 20) A "fifth shot." Multi le gunshots, 12 shots at close range, 13 and
shots to vital parts of the body, 4 can be used to show deliberation. An
execution style shot or a "kill shot" can be part of evidence used to show
deliberation. 15
pp. 20-21 ). The fact that Smith and Stockley did not know one another11

Evidence of conduct that is relevant to the issue of deliberation in a first degree
murder case falls into a least four broad categories. First, there may be direct evidence that
the defendant did or said certain things in advance of the act to facilitate the crime. This is
'"planning evidence.'"
State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 589 (Mo. 1997)
12

Evidence of a prolonged struggle, multiple wounds, or repeated blows may also
support an inference of deliberation.
State v. Elvin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 159 (Mo. 1998).
13

Even further, assuming the jury believed that Terry shot Schwartz from the distance
of a few inches-a fact upon which there was conflicting evidence-there is yet another
basis for finding deliberation. See Tisius. 92 S.W.3d at 764 (repeated shooting at closerange supported finding of deliberation); State 1·. Bra11cli, 757 S.W.2d 595, 598
(Mo.App.E.D.1988) (shooting at close range was some evidence of deliberation).
State v. Teny. 501 S.W.3d 456,460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). reh'g and/or transfer denied
(Aug. 30, 2016), transfer denied (Nov. 1, 2016)
14

Rejecting a contention that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the
element of deliberation, this Court held that the number. severity and location of the
wounds provided such a basis and that the inference of deliberation was made more
apparent by the fact that the assailant had procured and concealed a knife.
State v. Dickson, 691 S.W.2d 334,339 (Mo. C t App. 1985)
15

The evidence, however, also suppo1ts the conclusion that the fatal wounds were
inflicted at the Blue Valley Park in an execution style killing which would clearly establish
deliberation. The manner of Ms. Walker's death, therefore, supported an inference of
deliberation. but did not conclusively establish deliberation.
State v. Maynard, 954 S.W.2d 624. 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
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-had no "prior history"--is highlighted by the Judge as "si g n ificant." "Bad
blood" between two parties can be evidence to show deliberation. 16
However, it seems possible that a basis for "bad blood" could be found in a)
Smith's ramming the police vehicle, and b) leading the officers on a chase.
Moreover, deliberation can be found even if there is no prior hostile
relationship. 17
p. 21n.10) The court suggests that in situations that are "dangerous,"
"stressful" and "frenetic" show lack of "cool" deliberation. However, cases
involving similar dangerous, stressful, and frenetic circumstances have not
barred a finding of deliberation--especially given that deliberation can arise
in a matter of seconds. 18 As the Missouri Supreme Court put it in a 2013
opinion, "Deliberation is not a question of t i m e - a n instant is sufficientand the reference to 'cool reflection' does not require that the defendant be
detached or disinterested. Instead, the element of deliberation serves to
ensure that the jury believes the defendant acted deliberately, consciously
and not reflexively." 19
p. 24) Self-defense. As noted above, the statute has undergone some
changes. But the core has remained the same, and the basics are this: if you
fear imminent use of deadly force against you, and reasonably believe that
only deadly force is sufficient to remove the threat to your life/physical
safety, you are justified in using deadly force to remove the threat. Thus the
elements of self-defense when deadly force is used are roughly: 1) the
defendant didn't start it, 2) there was a real necessity for the defendant to
use deadly force in order to save himself/herself from danger, 3) the
16

Second, there may be evidence of a pre-existing relationship between the victim and
the de fe ndant prior to the murder that provides a motiw for the killing. This is "bad-blood
evidence.'"
State v. Miller. 220 S.W.3tl 862, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)
17

As one treatise explains:

Even when there is no prior relationship between victim an<l <lefen<lant an<l the time
for deliberation is brief, the particular facts of a case can lead lo a finding that
premeditation has been sufficiently proved.
§ 95:18.Premeditation, 3 Crim. Prac. Manual§ 95:18
18 See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 810 S.W.2tl 682. 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (deliberation
found lo have occuned during a struggle for a purse during a robbery).
19

State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Mo. 2013).
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defendant's belief in the necessity was reasonable, and 4) the defendant did
all within his power to avoid the danger and the need to take a life. 20 As
explained above, while a police officer does have to use less than deadly
force if that would be enough to prevent the danger, the officer does not
have to retreat--and in fact, can pursue a person he or she believes is
dangerous (so in some sense, they may be the "initial aggressor").
p. 24) Judge Wilson sees the key factual question as whether Smith had
a gun; someone pointing a deadly weapon at you is a rather common basis
for asserting self-defense, and one can win on self-defense even if the
weapon is not found (or did not exist), provided that the belief that the
weapon was there was reasonable. 2 1
p. 26) The court's observation based on "thirty years on the bench"
about urban heroin dealers and guns. Judges--in jury trials--usually can
only find "facts" if they are uncontroversial and widely known (something
known as taking "judicial notice" of facts). 22 But things are different in a
bench trial. Here, the judge acts as the jury. Jurors are not confined to the
facts at the trial, but can use facts from their experience as a basis for a
judgment. So there is less of a constraint on the kinds of facts that can be
20

These are from a case called Chambers:

Deadly force may be used in self-defense only when there is (1) an absence of
aggression or provocation on the part of the defender, (2) a real or apparently real necessity
for the defender to kill in order to save himself from an immediate danger of serious bodily
injury or death, (3) a reasonable cause for the defender's belief in such necessity, and (4) an
attempt by the defender to do all within his power consistent with his personal safety to
avoid the danger and the need to take a life.
State v. Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1984)
21

The appearances doctrine operates to justify a person to act in self-defense although
it later proves the appearances were false.
State v. Minnis, 486 S.W.2d 280,283 (Mo. 1972)
22 The application of the doctrine of judicial notice, either as a rule of evidence or as an
instrument of judicial reasoning, is subject to well recognized limits. The basic operative
condition of judicial notice is the notoriety of the fact to be noticed. It must be pait of the
common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelligence; only then
does it become proper to assume the existence of that fact without proof. It follows,
therefore, that judicial notice must be exercised cautiously, and if there is doubt as to the
notoriety of such fact. judicial recognition of it must be declined.
English v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S. W.2d 33, 40-41 (Mo. 1968)
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considered: jurors can use their own common sense and their experience to
bring to bear on a case. Still, that experience must be "common." 23
A Supreme Court case from earlier this year may be worth mentioning
in light of some recent commentary on the verdict. 24 In Pena-Rodriguez v.
California, the Court held that racially charged statements made by a juror
could be the basis for vacating a death sentence. 25 This however is an
acquittal, not a conviction, so there does not appear to be any basis for the
state to challenge the verdict on the grounds that the Judge demonstrated
bias. 26
The Judge also, presumably, imputed this (to him) commonsense
observation to Stockley. In footnote 9 (p. 21 ), Judge Wilson notes he
rejected the defense's request to introduce evidence of Smith's prior
criminal record, because Stockley did not know it. But perhaps Stockley
would have a similar record of experience as the Judge, and so be aware of
the probability of a gun. It is also possible that the Judge's observation is
used merely to enhance, in the Judge's eyes, the credibility of Stockley as to
whether the gun was found or planted. In fact, this seems the safest
assumption.
23

In the words of one old Missouri case:

Jurors may sometimes draw on knowledge that comes from the common experience of
mankind to ossist them in reaching a conclusion, but that is knowledge that men in general
have, not a few in particular. If it is knowledge that comes by the cxpe1icnce of a class in o
particular business it must be proven by evidence.
Bownrnn v. Am. Car & Foundrv Co., 226 Mo. 53, 125 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1910)
24

See, e.g., the recently published op-ed, Judge Wilson is guilty - as hell - o f explicit
bias, The St. Louis American (Sept. 15, 2017).
25

[T]he Court now holds that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he
or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rnle give way in order to pe1mit the trial
comt to consider the evidence of the juror's statement an<l any resulting denial of the jury
Ilia! guarantee.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017)
26

This goes to the fundamental asymmetry in a criminal trial, as embodied in the rule
against putting a criminal defendant in "double jeopardy." A defendant who loses can
appeal, and usually does. When the state loses--and the defendant is acquitted--it is only in
very rare circumstances that the state can challenge the verdict and ask for a do-over.
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p. 29) In a case where first degree murder is charged, other homicide
charges are "lesser included offenses." In theory, the judge could have
found Stockley guilty of a lesser, homicide charge. The state wanted him to
do this, if he found Stockley innocent of first degree murder. The defense
did not--they wanted first degree murder or nothing. This strategically may
make some sense, especially if they thought they were especially strong on
self-defense.
pp. 29-30) In a case called State v. Beeler, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that even in a case where self-defense was successful against first
degree murder, it could be that a lesser homicide charge was supported. 27 If
you shot in justified self-defense, but used more force than was necessary,
you might still be guilty of recklessly causing the death of another, even if
you did not intentionally kill another. 28 Nonetheless, because Judge Wilson
found that Stockley's use of force was justified, he felt that Stockley was
not guilty of any homicide crime, and declined to consider the possible
lesser charges in any detail.

27

As a later case explained:

We acknowledge that, under Beeler, the fact that Pulley intentionally shot Coleburg.
does not, as a matter of law, foredose the possibility that he could be acquitted of seconddegree murder. and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
State v. Pullev, 356 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)
28

[R]eckless conduct is not inconsistent with the intentional act of defending one's
self, if in doing so one uses unreasonable force.
State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294. 299 (Mo. 2000)

